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A LACK OF CIVILITY: HOW NEW JERSEY LAW FAILS TO 
PROTECT WOMEN 
Nick Tamburri* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
M.R. had been living in New Jersey for six years when he met 
A.R. in 1985.1  The two became romantically involved and moved to 
Mississippi in 1987, where they were married shortly after the birth of 
their first child.2  They had two more children and moved back and 
forth between Mississippi and New Jersey several times during their 
marriage before settling in Mississippi in 1989.3  The marriage began 
to deteriorate soon thereafter and A.R. was increasingly subjected to 
various forms of domestic violence.4  The mental and physical abuse 
reached its apex on April 4, 2000, when M.R., unprovoked, jumped 
on top of A.R. as she laid in bed.5  M.R. proceeded to pin her down, 
yanking her hair and repeatedly punching her in the face, neck, and 
jaw.6  Her resistance was futile.  Her cries for help only served to 
worsen the situation, causing A.R. to dig the barrel of his gun into 
her temple and threaten to blow her brains out “all over th[e] wall.”7 
After receiving emergency care at the hospital later that night, 
A.R. took her children and fled to her sister’s home in New Jersey.8  
But M.R. had previously threatened to kill the entire family, 
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       1  A.R. v. M.R., 799 A.2d 27, 28–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 2  Id. at 29. 
 3  Id. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id.  
 7  A.R., 799 A.2d at 30. 
 8  Id. 
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including himself, if she ever tried to leave him.9  M.R. called the 
house repeatedly over the next few days in an effort to locate his 
family.10  A.R. was able to obtain an ex parte temporary restraining 
order (TRO) less than a week later as a result of the fear created by 
M.R.’s phone calls, thus preventing him from contacting A.R.11  A.R. 
v. M.R. manifests the crucial role that a domestic violence protective 
order can serve in the effort to protect a woman from violence. 
By contrast, S.P. v. City of Newark illustrates the potential 
limitations of the current New Jersey domestic violence laws by 
emphasizing their exclusive nature.12  In S.P., the plaintiff lived in a 
boarding house across the hall from Louis Santiago, Jr. 
(“Santiago”)—her eventual attacker.13  She contacted the police after 
Santiago made sexual advances and grabbed her inappropriately.14  
But S.P. had no ability to obtain a civil protection order, due to gaps 
in New Jersey law.15  The police did not make an arrest and failed to 
remove Santiago from the premises.16  Santiago sexually assaulted S.P. 
the next morning.17 
The current law in New Jersey leaves a class of potential victims 
in danger because it does not protect those who are not involved in a 
specific, statutorily-defined relationship.18  The New Jersey Prevention 
of Domestic Violence Act of 1991 (PDVA or the Act) defines a “victim 
of domestic violence” as: 
any person who is [eighteen] years of age or older or who is 
an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to 
domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, or any other 
person who is a present or former household member.  “Victim of 
domestic violence” also includes any person, regardless of 
age, who has been subjected to domestic violence by a 
person with whom the victim has a child in common, or 
with whom the victim anticipates having a child in common, 
if one of the parties is pregnant. “Victim of domestic 
violence” also includes any person who has been subjected 
to domestic violence by a person with whom the victim has 
 
 9  Id. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Id. 
 12  See infra Part V; S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2012). 
 13  S.P., 52 A.3d at 180. 
 14  Id.  
 15  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011); see also infra Part III. 
 16  S.P., 52 A.3d at 181. 
 17  Id.; see infra Part V. 
 18  See §§ 2C:25-17–35. 
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had a dating relationship.19 
Those who fall outside the scope of this definition cannot obtain 
a civil protection order under any circumstances.20  Additionally, the 
judiciary must determine who constitutes a “household member,” as 
that term is not defined under the statute. This ambiguity can 
threaten potential victims, making it harder for them to immediately 
obtain a TRO. 
Santiago’s assault was disgraceful, but it was unclear whether it 
was an act of domestic violence under New Jersey law because it was 
questionable whether the judiciary would conclude that Santiago and 
S.P. were “household members” under the PDVA.21  Such violence 
and the corresponding lack of protection given to the victim is 
representative of a chasm that exists under current New Jersey law.  
In accordance with legislative intent, the judiciary has justifiably 
interpreted the domestic violence protection laws liberally to afford 
sweeping protection to victims.22  Still, if the judiciary was to further 
expand its interpretation of “household member,” it would offer 
recourse to victims whom the Act was not intended to protect.23  
Specifically, the Act is intended to protect victims of domestic 
violence only.24  Thus, the law necessarily leaves certain victims 
without recourse.  These victims may include any woman sexually 
assaulted by a co-worker, classmate, acquaintance, stranger, or even a 
friend she has not dated.  Therefore, New Jersey must enact a 
separate civil-remedy statute to safeguard these potential victims from 
domestic violence. 
This Comment will examine a victim’s ability to obtain redress in 
New Jersey for acts of violence committed by an acquaintance or a 
stranger.  Specifically, it will examine how New Jersey law applies to 
women who may not fall within the traditional definition of what 
constitutes a “household member” under the PDVA.  Part II of this 
Comment takes a historical look at domestic violence.  Part III 
explains the role of civil protective orders and their ability to 
safeguard potential victims.  Specifically, it examines Maryland law 
and its use of civil protection orders.  Part IV then reviews the law 
under the PDVA.  Part V examines S.P. v. City of Newark, a case 
recently decided by the Appellate Division, to illustrate why New 
 
 19  § 2C:25-19(d) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 20  See §§ 2C:25-17–35. 
 21  See id.  
 22  See infra Part V.A. 
 23  See infra Part V. 
 24  See infra Part II.A. 
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Jersey must allow potential victims to obtain protective orders outside 
of the domestic violence context.  This section examines how courts 
in New Jersey have interpreted the term “household member” under 
the statute and the resulting implications for women such as S.P.  
Finally, Part VI will discuss New Jersey’s options to address the 
situation and change its current law.  This Comment will argue that 
New Jersey should add a statute that allows a potential victim the 
ability to obtain a civil protective order under New Jersey civil law. 
II.  THE BACKGROUND ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Domestic violence is an epidemic.25  Every nine seconds in the 
United States, a woman is assaulted or beaten.26  Domestic violence 
accounts for more injuries to women than car accidents, muggings, 
and rapes combined.27  It is the leading cause of injury to women in 
the United States28 and also “accounts for twenty percent of all non-
fatal [sic] crime experienced by women in [this country].”29  The cost 
of intimate-partner violence alone in the United States exceeds $5.8 
billion each year—$4.1 billion of which goes to direct medical and 
health care services, while productivity losses account for nearly $1.8 
billion.30 
Domestic violence is defined as the “willful intimidation, physical 
assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior 
perpetrated by an intimate partner against another.”31  It affects 
people of all ages, economic statuses, races, religions, and 
educational backgrounds.32  Despite such revealing statistics, domestic 
violence has not always figured so prominently in our collective 
consciousness as a societal issue.  Historically, domestic violence was 
viewed as a private matter and not the concern of the criminal justice 
system or society as a whole.33  Thus, common law courts protected a 
 
 25  See Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 391 (N.J. 1998).  
 26  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS, http://domesticviolencestatistics.org 
/domestic-violence-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2012). 
 27  Id. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing 
Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 867 (2009). 
 30  DOMESTIC VIOLENCE STATISTICS, supra note 26.   
 31  Domestic Violence Facts, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2012). 
 32  Id. 
 33  Davis Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting Judicial Bias in Domestic 
Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 995, 1000 
(2005). 
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man’s right to use domestic violence as a tool to manage his 
household.34 
Western law provided a man with the right to chastise to his wife, 
allowing sanctioned violence against women according to the 
common-law “rule of thumb.”35  This rule allowed a husband to beat 
his wife with a stick, so long as the stick was no wider than his 
thumb.36  Thus, courts were very reluctant at common law to get 
involved in family matters.  The rule’s proponents justified it “as a 
natural and necessary right of control, incident to the man’s role as 
head of the family.”37  This was reflective of the widely held societal 
view that family was its own private entity.38 
The North Carolina Supreme Court captured the prevailing 
sentiment of the times in State v. Rhodes: “We will not inflict upon 
society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, 
to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence.”39  Three years later, 
Alabama became the first state to rule that a husband did not have 
the right to beat his wife.40  The Alabama Supreme Court held that a 
“wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband 
can invoke for himself.”41  By the end of the nineteenth century, three 
states had adopted laws against domestic violence that made wife-
beating a punishable offense.42 
The feminist movement of the 1960s brought a heightened 
attention to family violence, which motivated the establishment of 
rape crisis centers and battered women’s shelters.43  California 
founded one of the first battered women’s shelters in 1964.44  The 
 
 34  Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic Violence: III. New State and 
Federal Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1528 (1993) (citing 
State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 456–57 (1868)). 
 35  See James Martin Truss, Comment, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled 
Promises of Protection for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 
1157 (1995). 
 36  Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on 
an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1288 (2000). 
 37  Truss, supra note 35, at 1157 (citing Hand v. Hand, 133 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 
1965)). 
 38  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1288. 
 39  Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 459 (1868). 
 40  See Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (1871).  
 41  Id. at 147. 
 42  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1289 (citing Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa, Domestic 
Violence: The Criminal Justice Response 174–75 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 
1996)).  Nine other states were also considering stronger laws against wife-beating.  
Id. 
 43  Id. at 1290. 
 44  Id. (citing JEFFREY FAGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH 
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feminist movement was an integral part of the initial realization that 
domestic violence had become a significant social problem.  
“Feminists were vocal, organized, and effective in their efforts to 
persuade the government that domestic violence was not 
acceptable.”45 
It was also during this period that the phrase “domestic violence” 
came to be understood as synonymous with wife abuse.46  The term 
was previously used to refer to general violence such as sixties-era 
ghetto riots or urban terrorism.47  Government involvement in 
domestic violence included the proliferation of new shelters, 
intervention programs, and published studies.  For example, “the first 
batterer-intervention programs were created [in 1975],” conclusively 
framing the domestic violence issue as “the man’s problem.”48  A 
variety of legislative and policy reforms were enacted in the 1980s, 
including specialized prosecution units for domestic violence, 
increased intervention programs, and protection orders that allowed 
for improved access to emergency orders.49  Still, many viewed this 
legislation as “an attack on the American family, and a means of 
funding feminist causes.”50 
Despite this view, “states substantially expanded their laws on 
domestic violence during the 1970s and 1980s.”51  The reforms also 
 
REPORT: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND 
LIMITS 6–9 (1996)). 
 45  Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 793 (2007). 
 46  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1290. 
 47  Id. (citing ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY 
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 194 (1987)). 
 48  Id. (citing PLECK, supra note 46, at 192).  According to the United States 
Department of Justice, eighty-five percent of domestic violence victims are women.  
See Callie Marie Rennison, Bureau of Justice Statistics Crime Data Brief: Intimate Partner 
Violence, 1993–2001, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 2003), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.  Although the focus of this 
Comment is to manifest the plight of women as victims of violence, this Comment 
does not deny or minimize the existence of male victims.  The author intends his use 
of female pronouns throughout the Comment as gender inclusive and uses such 
terms because victims are statistically more likely to be women.  For a discussion on 
heterosexual men as victims of domestic violence and bias in the application of 
domestic violence laws, see Amanda J. Schmesser, Note, Real Men May Not Cry, But 
They Are Victims of Domestic Violence: Bias in the Application of Domestic Violence Laws, 58 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 171 (2007); see also Silver v. Silver, 903 A.2d 446 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2006). 
 49  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1290–91 (citing FAGAN, supra note 44, at 9). 
 50  Bernadette Dunn Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and Legislative 
Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983, 999 (1989). 
 51  Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1841, 1857 (2006). 
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tended to occur in a piecemeal fashion, starting with protection and 
relief for victims in marital relationships and then extending to other 
people who appeared to be in a marriage-like relationship.52  Even 
after instituting laws that criminalized domestic violence, 
enforcement conduct remained inadequate, so legislatures instituted 
mandatory arrest policies for domestic violence situations.53  But 
mandatory arrest policies do not assist women like S.P., who are not 
victims of “domestic” violence arising from a relationship.  As 
demonstrated by the case of S.P., the protections offered by domestic 
violence laws are not all-inclusive and leave some women 
unprotected. 
Today, all states enforce their domestic violence laws through 
enhanced criminal penalties as well as civil protection orders.54  States 
fall into four vastly different categories with respect to the protection 
of adult victims of domestic violence.55  State domestic violence laws 
may cover: (1) only individuals in opposite-sex relationships; (2) 
individuals in a “dating relationship”; (3) individuals who live in the 
same household; or (4) individuals in same-sex relationships.56  The 
focus of this Comment predominantly involves the treatment of 
individuals who live in the same “household” and those with a prior 
dating relationship. 
New Jersey responded to domestic violence by enacting the 
PDVA, which offers broad protection to many of those who fall into 
the aforementioned categories.57  The New Jersey Legislature passed 
the PDVA “to assure victims of domestic violence the maximum 
protection from abuse the law can provide.”58  A “victim of domestic 
violence” includes any person “who is eighteen years of age or older 
or who is an emancipated minor and who has been subjected to 
domestic violence by a spouse, former spouse, or any other person 
who is a present or former household member.”59  The statute does 
not define the term “household member,” although New Jersey 
courts have liberally construed the term.60  Despite its liberal 
 
 52  Id. 
 53  Jane Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using The Stages of Change Model to Realize the 
Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 314 (2011). 
 54  Colker, supra note 51, at 1857. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 1857–58. 
 57  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(d) (West 2011). 
 58  Sperling v. Teplitsky, 683 A.2d 244, 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
 59  § 2C:25-19(d). 
 60  See Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 393 (N.J. 1998). 
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construction, the PDVA leaves women residing in community 
housing unprotected by New Jersey law.61 
Domestic abuse pervades all social and economic levels, but 
women of lower socio-economic status are at a higher risk of 
becoming victims of domestic violence.62  Some studies even suggest 
that domestic violence is a major cause of poverty.63  But poor women 
who reside in boarding houses are not necessarily protected from 
violence under the PDVA.64  Despite substantial progress in legal 
remedies for domestic violence victims of all economic levels in New 
Jersey, the law does not provide victims of acquaintance and stranger 
violence with the same protection and remedies.65  Therefore, New 
Jersey’s domestic violence law is not overly inclusive, since it leaves 
certain victims unprotected.  Although S.P. was tragically victimized, 
she was left vulnerable and unable to obtain a civil protection order 
because it was questionable whether or not she was involved in a 
domestic violence incident as defined by the PDVA.66 
III.  CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS 
The past several decades of domestic violence law reform have 
focused on criminalizing domestic violence and thus remedying 
domestic violence problems through criminal penalties.67  
Nevertheless, by 1993, every jurisdiction in the country had enacted 
civil protection order laws pursuant to their domestic violence 
statutes.68  One of the most commonly utilized remedies for domestic 
abuse is a civil order of protection, which is an injunctive protection 
order, often granted ex parte, that the court issues to impose 
restrictions on a person’s future behavior.69  The order may prohibit 
any contact between the parties, allow contact but forbid abusive 
 
 61  See infra Part V. 
 62  Elizabeth J. Thomas, Building a Statutory Shelter for Victims of Domestic Violence: 
The United States Housing Act and Violence Against Women Act in Collaboration, 16 WASH. 
U.J.L. & POL’Y 289, 293 (2004). 
 63  Id. (citing Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character, and Social Change in the 
Welfare Reform Debate, 19 LAW & POL’Y 205, 206 (1997)). 
 64  See infra Part V. 
 65  See infra Part IV. 
 66  See also Sandoval v. Mendez, 521 A.2d 1168 (D.C. 1987) (holding that a woman 
was not entitled to a civil protection order, despite that she used to live with her 
attacker and was beaten in her own home).  The court reasoned that the parties did 
not share an intimate relationship and thus she had no right to a protective order.  
Id. at 1169. 
 67  Stoever, supra note 53, at 305. 
 68  Id. at 306 (emphasis added). 
 69  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1292. 
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behavior, or address issues such as mandated counseling, child 
custody, visitation, and support.70  Given the choice between a 
criminal and civil remedy, victims frequently utilize the civil justice 
system in their efforts to prevent violence because a civil protection 
order is easier to obtain than a criminal protection order.71 
Scholars have advocated the use of civil protection orders as a 
result of positive victim feedback, their proven effectiveness, and the 
autonomy-promoting character that is associated with enhanced 
safety.72  One study that measured the efficacy of protection orders 
found that when a woman applied and qualified for a protection 
order, she experienced a “rapid and significant decline in violence.”73  
Although both can be utilized to prevent future violence, a woman 
must rely on criminal courts for protection when the law precludes 
her from obtaining a civil protection order.74  Victims of violence or 
sexual assault who cannot receive protection under domestic violence 
laws can potentially receive protection under criminal laws such as 
stalking or assault and battery.75  But a civil protection order offers 
several basic advantages over a criminal order of protection, and, 
consequently, civil protection orders are now the most frequently 
used legal remedy to address intimate partner violence.76 
The comparative benefits offered by a civil protection order are 
among the reasons that New Jersey should amend its laws to adopt 
such orders as a remedy for those involved in non-intimate partner 
violence.77  First, a permanent civil order of protection can be granted 
more quickly than a criminal order of protection.78  Second, courts 
apply a lower standard of proof79: in most states, a victim must only 
 
 70  Id. 
 71  Stoever, supra note 53, at 308 (citing Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System 
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and Risks of Integrated Case Management and 
Technology Solutions, in Handbook of Domestic Violence Intervention Strategies 147, 
149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (“finding that survivors are more likely to seek 
relief from violence solely in the civil system through protection orders, as compared 
to using the criminal justice system”). 
 72  Id. at 318–19. 
 73  Id. at 319 (citing Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner 
Violence: An 18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 613, 613–18 (2004)). 
 74  See generally Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order 
Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93 (2005) (contrasting domestic 
violence civil protection orders from other types of protection orders). 
 75  Id. at 100. 
 76  See supra Part III. 
 77  See infra Part VI. 
 78  Smith, supra note 74, at 119. 
 79  See id. 
TAMBURRI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  1:58 PM 
1050 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1041 
sustain proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.80  This allows a potential victim to more 
easily establish that she may be in danger.  Third, scholars argue that 
civil protection orders empower the victim.81  In criminal cases, the 
prosecutor will decide how to proceed, if at all.82  A civil protection 
order allows a victim her choice of remedies and control over the 
direction of her case.83  Fourth, civil protection orders are far more 
comprehensive than criminal orders.84  Fifth, police immediately 
enforce temporary restraining orders, whereas criminal court orders 
to not contact a victim can only be enforced via charges and 
returning to court for a hearing.85 
Civil orders can provide relief in various forms, including 
mandating child support or visitation, requiring an abuser to enter a 
drug rehabilitation program, ordering an abuser to make certain 
payments, or fashioning a remedy specific to the victim.86  But an 
abuser who is subject to a civil protection order will not go to jail or 
face any criminal punishment unless he later violates the order. This 
may be important to those victims who may have been acquainted 
with their abuser or share mutual friends.  But most significantly, a 
woman does not even have the option to utilize a civil protection 
order if it is unavailable under the law. 
Despite the benefits that civil protection orders offer, they have 
been criticized.  One criticism of protective orders concerns the 
general inadequacy of protection orders to prevent further abuse.87  
Unfortunately, orders of protection alone may not be the most 
effective remedy for preventing future violence in all cases.  For 
example, in 1996, one study found that sixty percent of orders of 
protection were violated within one year, while another study 
indicated that almost fifty percent of court-issued protection orders 
were violated within two years.88  In addition, a third study found that 
more than seventeen percent of victims killed in domestic incidents 
had obtained orders of protection.89  Even law enforcement officials 
 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. at 120. 
 82  Id. 
 83  Id. at 120. 
 84  Smith, supra note 74, at 121. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id.  
 87  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1292. 
 88  Id. at 1292. 
 89  Id. 
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admit that “protection orders do not necessarily save lives.”90  
Nevertheless, states now use civil protection orders expansively, and 
New Jersey should do so by allowing a woman to obtain a civil 
protection order in situations involving violence instigated by an 
acquaintance or a stranger.91 
A.  Maryland’s Civil Protection Order Statute 
Several states, like Maryland, have entirely removed the 
relationship requirement necessary for a potential victim to obtain a 
civil protection order.92  Such states allow any person who can prove 
the commission of a requisite act of abuse and a need for future 
protection to obtain a civil protection order without proving the 
existence of a relationship with the abuser.93  States offering these 
civil protective orders utilize separate statutes to provide relief for 
domestic violence under traditional relationship definitions as 
opposed to for victims of violence committed by an acquaintance or 
stranger.94  Although these alternative civil protection orders may not 
confer all of the benefits of a domestic violence protective order, they 
do allow a woman to get a restraining order if she faces potential 
danger.95  Under Maryland law, a petitioner may seek relief by filing a 
petition with the court that alleges the commission of any of the 
following acts against the petitioner by the respondent, if the act 
occurred within 30 days before the filing of the petition: 
(1) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (2) an act that 
places the petitioner in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; 
(3) assault in any degree; (4) rape or sexual offense under 
section 3-303 through section 3-308 of the Criminal Law 
Article or attempted rape or sexual offense in any 
degree; (5) false imprisonment; (6) harassment under 
section 3-803 of the Criminal Law Article; (7) stalking 
under section 3-802 of the Criminal Law Article; 
(8) trespass under Title 6, Subtitle 4 of the Criminal Law 
Article; or (9) malicious destruction of property under 
 
 90  Id. 
 91  See id. 
 92  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (2009). 
 93  See e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 12-1809 (2004) (allowing “any person” to obtain an 
injunction against another for acts of harassment); see also 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
22/201 (West 2003) (allowing victims of sex crimes to obtain orders of protection 
regardless of the relationship to the attacker, although not containing the same 
provisions as domestic violence protection orders). 
 94  See id.  
 95  See supra note 92. 
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section 6-301 of the Criminal Law Article.96 
If a Maryland judge finds that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the accused has committed, and is likely to commit in the 
future, an act specified in section 3-1503(a), the judge may issue a 
temporary peace order to protect the petitioner.97  The temporary 
peace order may include the following relief: 
(i) Order the respondent to refrain from committing or 
threatening to commit an act specified in § 3-1503(a) of this 
subtitle against the petitioner; (ii) Order the respondent to 
refrain from contacting, attempting to contact, or harassing 
the petitioner; (iii) Order the respondent to refrain from 
entering the residence of the petitioner; and (iv) Order the 
respondent to remain away from the place of employment, 
school, or temporary residence of the petitioner.98 
Consequently, such an array of statutory provisions enables 
Maryland citizens to seek protection from abusive relationships.99  
Where an abusive relationship exists between a victim and a 
neighbor, co-worker, or acquaintance, that victim may petition for 
interim, temporary, ex parte, or final peace orders, issued by a 
 
 96  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (West 2009) (emphasis added).   
In this section, “stalking” means a malicious course of conduct that 
includes approaching or pursuing another where the person intends to 
place or knows or reasonably should have known the conduct would 
place another in reasonable fear: (1)(i) of serious bodily injury; (ii) of 
an assault in any degree; (iii) of rape or sexual offense as defined by §§ 
3-303 through 3-308 of this title or attempted rape or sexual offense in 
any degree; (iv) of false imprisonment; or (v) of death.   
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. § 3-802 (West 2011).  In this section, “harassment” means 
that 
[a] person may not follow another in or about a public place or 
maliciously engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously 
annoys the other: (1) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the 
other; (2) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or 
on behalf of the other; and (3) without a legal purpose. 
§ 3-803. 
 97  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.,§ 3-1504(a)(1).  Maryland created an 
alternative statute to limit the relief available to victims not in a domestic violence 
relationship.  For example, a final peace order expires after only six months versus 
one year for a protective order.  § 3-1505(f).  Additionally, a protective order can 
lead to an order granting exclusive use and possession of a home or personal 
property while a peace order cannot.  § 3-1505(d)(1).  These restrictions thus 
minimize the potential damage from the anticipated increased number of frivolous 
or even meritorious but less serious filings, as manifested by situations involving 
verbal harassment or physical violence.  Such restrictions aim to limit system-wide 
abuse while still providing victims with the requisite protection.  
 98  § 3-1504(a)(2). 
 99  See id. 
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commissioner or judge of a district court.100  S.P. never met her 
attacker before the morning that she was raped, she had only passed 
him on the stairwell several days prior.101  If she lived in Maryland, her 
unfamiliarity with her attacker would not have been a factor in her 
ability to obtain a protective order.  But she was a resident of New 
Jersey, and thus was unable to immediately obtain a civil protection 
order. 
IV.  THE NEW JERSEY PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT OF 
1991102 
The Protection of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA or the Act) was 
designed to protect victims of domestic violence and to provide 
uniformity in adjudicating each claim.103  Under this New Jersey 
statute: 
“domestic violence” means the occurrence of one or more 
of the following acts inflicted upon a person protected 
under this act by an adult or an emancipated minor: (1) 
homicide; (2) assault; (3) terroristic threats; (4) 
kidnapping; (5) criminal restraint; (6) false imprisonment; 
(7) sexual assault; (8) criminal sexual contact; (9) lewdness; 
(10) criminal mischief; (11) burglary; (12) criminal 
trespass; (13) harassment; or (14) stalking.104 
Even when a victim proves the occurrence of a particular abusive 
act under the statute, the court must still inquire into the relationship 
between the parties to determine whether the PDVA applies to a 
particular victim.105  As aforementioned, the PDVA limits protection 
to those victimized by a spouse, former spouse, or any other person 
who is a present or former household member.106  A “victim of 
domestic violence” also includes victims of abuse by a person with 
whom the victim has had a past dating relationship.107 
The legislature has made several declarations regarding 
domestic violence: 
that domestic violence is a serious crime against society; that 
there are thousands of persons in New Jersey who are 
 
 100  Joshua Friedman and Gary Norman, Protecting the Family Pet: The New Face of 
Maryland Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 81, 90 (2009). 
 101  S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 102  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011). 
 103  D.C. v. F.R., 670 A.2d 51, 55 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 104  § 2C:25-19(a). 
 105  See id. 
 106  § 2C:25-19(d). 
 107  Id. 
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regularly beaten, tortured and in some cases even killed by 
their spouses or cohabitants; that a significant number of 
women who are assaulted are pregnant; that victims of 
domestic violence come from all social and economic 
backgrounds and ethnic groups; that there is a positive 
correlation between spousal abuse and child abuse; and 
that children, even when they are not themselves physically 
assaulted, suffer deep and lasting emotional effects from 
exposure to domestic violence.108 
“It is therefore, the intent of the legislature to assure the victims 
of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law 
can provide.”109  Accordingly, the PDVA affords greater protection for 
potential victims of domestic violence than is generally given to 
victims of crimes committed by strangers.110 
In order to achieve this goal, the PDVA authorizes courts to issue 
restraining orders to promote the safety of domestic violence 
victims.111  To that end, the PDVA affords a plaintiff the opportunity 
to seek emergency ex parte relief in the form of a TRO.112  A TRO is 
only available pursuant to a violation of the PDVA, specifically the 
commission of one of the fourteen abusive acts listed above.113  A 
TRO is typically granted by a judge of the Family Part of the Superior 
Court when necessary to protect the life, health, or well-being of a 
victim on whose behalf the relief is sought.114  The court rules 
generally require that an applicant for a TRO appear personally 
before a judge, but if it appears that the applicant is in danger of 
domestic violence, the judge has discretion to order emergency ex 
parte relief in the form of a TRO, as authorized by the PDVA.115  The 
emergency relief available under a TRO includes all relief available to 
a victim at a final hearing under the PDVA, together with any other 
appropriate relief, and it remains in effect until the court takes 
further action.116 
Emergency relief pursuant to a TRO may include forbidding the 
defendant from returning to the scene of the domestic violence, 
 
 108  § 2C:25-18. 
 109  Id.; State v. Volpini, 677 A.2d 780, 785 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); 
Sperling v. Teplitsky, 683 A.2d 244, 246 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996). 
 110  S.Z. v. M.C., 11 A.3d 404, 406 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
 111  State v. Dispoto, 913 A.2d 791, 798 (N.J. 2007). 
 112  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28(a) (West 2011). 
 113  Id. 
 114  § 2C:25-28(f). 
 115  § 2C:25-28(g); N.J. CT. R. 5:7A(a). 
 116  § 2C:25-28(g). 
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enjoining the defendant from possessing any firearm or other 
weapon, or any other appropriate relief.117  Perhaps most importantly, 
a judge can issue a TRO through electronic communication without 
the physical presence of the applicant, thus specifically aiding women 
who feel they are in imminent danger.118  A TRO “may issue if the 
judge is satisfied that exigent circumstances exist that are sufficient to 
excuse the failure of the applicant to appear personally and that 
sufficient grounds for granting the application have been shown.”119  
This protection, however, is solely contingent on a woman’s 
involvement in an incident of “domestic violence.”120  Thus, it is 
imperative to examine when a woman is considered a “household 
member” in New Jersey under the PDVA.  S.P. v. City of Newark, 
recently decided by the Appellate Division, is particularly illustrative 
in analyzing the razor-thin difference between who is a “household 
member” and who is not.121  If a potential victim is deemed a 
“household member,” she can obtain a TRO under the PDVA.  But if 
she is not, no such recourse is available to her. 
V.  S.P. V. CITY OF NEWARK: WHO IS A “HOUSEHOLD MEMBER”? 
S.P. was renting a room at a boarding house located on Milford 
Avenue in the City of Newark, New Jersey.122  She had moved into that 
residence in early February of 2008 and her room was located directly 
across the hall from a man who she had not met, named Santiago.123  
The two shared a kitchen and a bathroom at the end of the hall.124  In 
the few weeks that S.P. lived there, the two had never exchanged 
words or been formally introduced.125  They had one uneventful 
“interaction” in which they had passed each other in the stairwell.126  
Thus, S.P. and Santiago were essentially strangers prior to February 
17, 2008.127  Their relationship was similar to that of college dorm 
 
 117  §§ 2C:25-21(d), 2C:39-1(r). 
 118  N.J. CT. R. 5:7A(b)–(c). 
 119  Id. 
 120  See § 2C:25-19(d). 
 121  S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 122  Id. at 180.  A boarding house is a house in which the residents rent a room, 
sometimes for extended periods of weeks, months, or years.  See id.  The common 
parts of the house, such as a bathroom and kitchen, may be shared by the residents.  
See id.  Thus, a boarding house is not considered one residence, but rather several 
residences within a complex, which is more akin to an apartment-building setting. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id.  
 125  Id. 
 126  Id.  
 127  Id. 
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residents who live across the hall from one another, but who have not 
been formally introduced. 
As S.P. left her room to go to the bathroom after midnight on 
February 17, 2008, Santiago asked her if she wanted to have a drink.128  
S.P. declined and continued towards the bathroom.129  Santiago 
confronted S.P. when she left the bathroom, groping her right breast 
and buttocks and telling her that he wanted to have sex.130  S.P. 
pushed him away and locked herself in her room.131  Undeterred, 
Santiago tried to open her locked door.132  S.P. then called the police 
twice in an attempt to seek protection from Santiago.133  Police 
officers arrived after some delay, and S.P. met them at the front door 
to explain what happened to her, visually demonstrating to the police 
officers how Santiago had groped her.134  Santiago told the officers 
that he did not know S.P., and he denied that they had an intimate 
relationship.135  Because it was unclear whether this was a domestic 
violence situation, S.P. was not informed of her right to obtain a TRO 
under the PDVA.136 
The police officers left without making an arrest.137  They merely 
ordered Santiago to stay away from S.P. and instructed S.P. to call the 
police if he harassed her again.138  S.P. was resigned to return to her 
room with potential danger lurking just across the hall.139  S.P. left her 
room to take a shower the next morning, about ten hours after the 
police had left.140  As she attempted to exit the bathroom, she was 
confronted by a lurking figure in the doorway.141  Santiago brutally 
attacked S.P., raping her in the hallway.142  He then dragged her into 
 
 128  S.P., 52 A.3d at 180.   
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
 134  S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.   
 135  Id. 
 136  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-23 (West 2011) mandates that a law enforcement 
officer shall disseminate and explain to the victim the following written notice: “You 
have the right to go to court to get an order called a temporary restraining order, 
also called a TRO, which may protect you from more abuse by your attacker.  The 
officer who handed you this card can tell you how to get a TRO.” 
 137  S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.   
 138  Id.  
 139  Id.  
 140  Id. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. 
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his room and continued to rape her.143  S.P. eventually escaped and 
ran downstairs and out of the building.144  She subsequently filed a 
civil lawsuit on January 8, 2010, against Santiago, the landlord of the 
boarding house, Essex County (County), New Jersey (State), and the 
City of Newark (City or Newark).  She brought claims under the 
PDVA, arguing that the defendants were negligent, careless, and 
reckless in their failure to arrest and remove Santiago from the 
premises the night before the rape had occurred.145 
A critical inquiry in determining S.P.’s potential legal recourse 
against her landlord, the City, the County, and the State is whether 
Santiago and S.P. were “household members” under the PDVA.  That 
answer informs whether or not Santiago should have been arrested 
pursuant to New Jersey’s mandatory domestic violence arrest laws.146  
If S.P. and Santiago were considered “household members” under 
the PDVA, then in addition to the protection of a mandatory arrest, 
S.P. would have been able to seek a protection order, thereby 
potentially decreasing her exposure to violence, even in the absence 
of the arrest of Santiago or following any post-arrest release.  The City 
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the PDVA did not 
apply to the factual circumstances of the case.147  Among its 
arguments, the City contended that S.P. and Santiago were not 
“household members” under the PDVA.148  In an order dated May 27, 
2011, the trial court denied the City’s motion.149 
The trial court concluded that Santiago and S.P. were household 
members and thus the PDVA was applicable.150  The court held that 
there was “constancy” in the “relationship” between S.P. and Santiago 
because of the “close proximity of the parties’ rooms and the reality 
of living in a boarding house, which necessitates interaction between 
the parties.”151  The court also held that S.P. and Santiago satisfied the 
over-night stay at each other’s residence requirement because they 
 
 143  S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.   
 144  Id. 
 145  Id. 
 146  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21(a) (West 2011) (requiring that a police officer 
shall make an arrest if he or she “finds probable cause to believe that domestic 
violence has occurred” and “[t]he victim exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of 
domestic violence”). 
 147  S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.   
 148  Id. at 181–82. 
 149  Id. at 182. 
 150  Id.  
 151  Id. 
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lived on the same floor of a boarding house.152  The court further 
held that S.P. and Santiago stored items at each other’s residence 
because they shared a bathroom and common areas.153  The City 
subsequently filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal 
from the denial of summary judgment.154  The Appellate Division, 
recognizing the importance of this issue, granted the motion on July 
25, 2011.155 
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s holding, 
following the trial court’s rationale in concluding that S.P. and 
Santiago were household members under the PDVA.156  The 
Appellate Division focused on the parties’ living arrangement and 
shared common areas, assuming that “[c]rossing paths and 
interacting would be inevitable in this type of living arrangement.”157  
The Appellate Division was careful to warn, however, that “we do not 
conclude that all boarders in a rooming house are household 
members.”158  Thus, the holding was extremely narrow, limited to the 
specific circumstances of this case which involved two parties living 
across the hall from each other.  Furthermore, because it was 
questionable whether this was a domestic violence situation, the 
police did not even inform S.P. of her right to obtain a TRO, as 
mandated under the PDVA.159  A review of New Jersey precedent 
involving the interpretation of “household member” reveals that, 
although liberally construed, many potential victims will not qualify 
for relief under the PDVA.160 
“Violence-between-strangers” cases fall in the broader category 
of criminal acts by strangers and are not typically considered within 
the confines of the PDVA.161  S.P. and Santiago had not exchanged a 
single word prior to the incident, and there was no indication that 
the two shared a prior relationship.162  The two thus lacked the 
relationship criteria typically necessary for a court to find a 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  S.P., 52 A.3d at 182.   
 154  Id. at 183. 
 155  Id. at 180.   
 156  Id. at 188.  The Appellate Division’s holding on the “household member” issue 
was not dispositive, as the court held for Newark on other grounds.   
 157  Id.   
 158  Id. 
 159  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-23. 
 160  See infra Part V.A. 
 161  See Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (holding, 
contrary to precedent, that acquaintances were “household members” as defined by 
the PDVA). 
 162  S.P., 52 A.3d at 180. 
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“household member” relationship under New Jersey case law.163  
Although it was perhaps a stretch to consider S.P. and Santiago 
“household members,” the Appellate Division surprisingly relied 
solely on the fact that the parties lived on the same floor to find that 
an interaction at some point was inevitable.164  The court explained 
that since they were the only two living on the floor, S.P. would have 
become naturally aware that they shared a living space, despite that 
she hadn’t in the several weeks since she had moved in.165 
Prior to the Appellate Division’s holding, all such reported New 
Jersey cases that found the victim was a “household member” 
involved violence perpetrated by someone who was, at the very least, 
an acquaintance of the victim.166  Thus, the S.P. decision is an outlier.  
In fact, such a holding is most likely borne from the judiciary’s own 
sense that a strict interpretation of the law would fail to do justice for 
S.P.  Such an intuition accentuates the need for a uniform system 
change via a new alternative statute so that protection does not 
depend on the sympathy of an individual judge.  S.P. was in a highly 
vulnerable position, living right across the hall from a man who had 
just assaulted her and received only a verbal warning after she 
notified the police of his abuse.167  But she was unable to obtain 
protection because it was unclear whether she was a victim of 
domestic violence—a determination that would have been rendered 
moot had New Jersey law allowed for the issuance of civil protection 
orders.  This distinction exposes the fatal flaw in New Jersey’s current 
protection-order statutes, manifesting the necessity for change. 
A.  The New Jersey Judiciary’s Interpretation of “household member” 
A frequently litigated issue involving the interpretation of the 
PDVA is whether two parties constitute “household members” under 
the PDVA.  This interpretation is especially important to women, like 
S.P., who seek protection under the Act.  In 1994, the legislature 
changed the terminology in the statute from “cohabitant” to 
“household member” to expand the scope of relief under the 
PDVA.168  What follows is an analysis of cases that illustrate the fact 
that although New Jersey courts have liberally construed the 
definition of “household member,” such an interpretation still leaves 
 
 163  See infra Part V.A. 
 164  S.P., 52 A.3d at 188.   
 165  Id. 
 166  See Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001). 
 167  S.P., 52 A.3d at 181.   
 168  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–18 (West 2011). 
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many women who are in imminent danger unprotected under New 
Jersey’s civil laws. 
1.  Cases finding “household-member” status without 
intimate relationship 
Hamilton v. Ali offers a rare example of a case in which a New 
Jersey court held that a relationship between mere acquaintances 
qualified as one between “household members” and thus the case fell 
under the jurisdiction of the PDVA.169  In Hamilton, the court decided 
whether college dorm mates were of the same “household.”170  The 
court held that the parties were household members pursuant to the 
PDVA, ruling that the 
plaintiff and defendant each has separate sleeping quarters 
but must interact on a frequent basis and because the 
qualities and characteristics of their relationship (i.e. daily 
contact for one month with the potential for one academic 
year, each having a key to the suite entrance, and sharing 
the bathroom and common area) placed plaintiff in a more 
susceptible position for abusive and controlling behavior in 
the hands of the defendant.171 
The Hamilton court cited Desiato v. Abbott, which set forth the 
following criteria to be applied on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether there exists a “family-like setting” within the meaning of the 
PDVA: (1) constancy of the relationship; (2) over-night stays at each 
other’s residence; (3) personalty items such as jewelry, clothing, and 
personal grooming effects stored at each other’s residences; (4) 
shared property arrangements, such as automobile usage, access to 
each other’s bank accounts, and one mailing address for billing and 
other legal purposes; and (5) familiarity with each other’s siblings 
and parents socially in dining and/or entertainment activities 
together, and/or attendance together at extended family functions 
such as weddings.172 
Hamilton’s decision that college dorm mates can qualify as 
household members under the PDVA supports the holding that S.P. 
 
 169  Hamilton, 795 A.2d at 934. 
 170  Id. at 933. 
 171  Id. 
 172  See Desiato v. Abbott, 617 A.2d 678, 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1992).  The 
Hamilton court also relied on the Appellate Division’s interpretation of a durational 
requirement set forth in Bryant v. Burnett, 624 A.2d 584, 585•86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div.), cert. denied, 134 N.J. 478 (1993).  The Bryant court held that a three-month time 
period in which the parties resided together was sufficient to constitute a “household 
member” relationship.  Id. at 587. 
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and Santiago were household members.  But no New Jersey court, 
prior to S.P., had extended the interpretation of “household 
member” to protect a victim from the violent actions of an 
acquaintance or stranger with whom the victim had not, until then, 
interacted.  This is not surprising, considering that while the PDVA 
protects victims from domestic violence by intimate partners, 
acquaintance-based violence has historically been the province of the 
state’s criminal laws.173 
Applying the Hamilton criteria to the aforementioned facts of 
S.P. v. Newark, one could argue that the courts wrongly decided that 
S.P. and Santiago were “household members.”  The first factor—
constancy of the relationship—could not be established because the 
parties only crossed paths once in a three-week period.174  The second 
factor—overnight stays at each other’s residence—did not necessarily 
occur.175 The boarding house the two shared was a combination of 
several residences within a complex, akin to an apartment-building 
setting.176  The third factor—having personalty items at each other’s 
residence—was certainly not present.177  The fourth—shared property 
arrangements—did not exist.178  Finally, S.P. and Santiago did not 
even know each other and thus had no familiarity with each other’s 
families, as required by the fifth factor.179  Thus, it is likely that S.P. 
should not have qualified as a household member under these 
factors.  In fact, the Hamilton court noted that the case “certainly 
involved more than assaultive conduct between casual friends or 
relative strangers.”180  But S.P. and Santiago were relative strangers 
when Santiago assaulted S.P.181 
Nevertheless, it was the analysis of these very factors that led the 
Appellate Division to affirm the trial court’s conclusion that S.P. was a 
household member.182  But the S.P. ruling is an outlier because 
Hamilton and S.P. are distinguishable.  The shared common area is 
the only similarity between Hamilton and S.P.  Indeed, Judge 
Fitzgerald of the Court of Appeals of Michigan even opined that to 
extend domestic violence to college roommates, a similar scenario, 
 
 173  See supra Part III. 
 174  S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. 
 180  Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 933 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001). 
 181  See supra Part V. 
 182  S.P., 52 A.3d at 178. 
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would be “absurd.”183  The “relationship” shared by S.P. and Santiago 
was much less significant than the relationship shared by college 
roommates. 
In S.Z. v. M.C., the Appellate Division similarly adopted a broad 
definition of “household member” when it reversed the trial court’s 
determination that the defendant, a “visitor” who resided in the 
plaintiff’s home for seven months, was not a “household member” 
under the PDVA.184  The Appellate Division held that although the 
two men never had a traditional familial, romantic, or sexual 
relationship, neither their incompatible sexual orientations nor the 
timeframes involved defeated jurisdiction; the former male 
houseguest did fall within the definition of a “household member” 
under the Act.185  The S.Z. court focused on the qualities and 
characteristics of the parties’ relationship in holding that the guest 
was a “household member.”186  Thus, the court decided that the 
parties’ relationship was determinative.187  As such, this case is also 
distinguishable from S.P.  In S.Z., the parties’ relationship went well 
beyond that of acquaintances.188  Specifically, the parties in S.Z. lived 
under the same roof for seven months.189  By contrast, Santiago and 
S.P. lived in the same boarding house for just three weeks and had 
never actually met.190  Thus, S.P. can be distinguished from even those 
cases in which the court adopted the most liberal interpretation of 
“household member” under the PDVA. The “outlier-nature” of the 
S.P. decision further reinforces the need for New Jersey to enact a 
civil statute to implement the use of civil protection orders.191 
2.  Cases finding no “household member” status 
New Jersey courts have liberally construed the term “household 
member” to offer broad protection under the PDVA.192  Still, this 
 
 183  In re Lovell, 572 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Mich. App. 1997) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 
 184  S.Z. v. M.C., 11 A.3d 404, 407 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011). 
 185  Id. at 405. 
 186  Id. 
 187  See also D.A.G. v. P.H., No. FV-13-1862-10, 2011 WL 5864553, at *5 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Nov. 23, 2011) (affirming the trial court’s issuance of a restraining 
order pursuant to the PDVA, holding that even though the two brothers were raised 
in different homes from birth, their development of a familial relationship as adults 
qualified them as former “household members” and thus subjected them to the 
jurisdiction of the PDVA).   
 188  S.Z., 11 A.3d at 405. 
 189  Id. 
 190  S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).   
 191  S.P., 52 A.3d at 178. 
 192  See supra Part V.A.1. 
TAMBURRI (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  1:58 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1063 
interpretation does not reach all women and thus leaves many 
unnecessarily susceptible to harm.  Despite the judiciary’s liberal 
interpretation of the term “household member” in some cases, the 
Appellate Division, in Smith v. Moore, instructed that “there are 
rational limits to this very expansive definition of a victim of domestic 
violence.”193  These rational limits are borne out by the recognition 
that the PDVA does not apply to every relationship in which a 
common roof is shared.  The Smith court narrowly interpreted the 
PDVA in analyzing an incident that arose between two former 
household members.194  The court justified its holding as necessary to 
curb the increased number of domestic violence cases brought before 
the court.195 
In Smith, the victim and her harasser previously shared a home 
on the weekends in the summer of 1995—almost a year before she 
sought a restraining order.196  The defendant appealed the final 
restraining order (FRO) entered pursuant to the PDVA.  The order 
was based on a series of harassing phone calls allegedly made by the 
defendant from November 1995 through April 1996.197  The Smith 
court concluded that the trial court judge did not have jurisdiction 
under the PDVA to enter a restraining order since the parties did not 
share the requisite domestic relationship to establish jurisdiction 
under the PDVA.198  Indeed, New Jersey courts are only allowed to 
issue civil protection orders pursuant to the PDVA.199 
The Smith court, like the Desiato court before it, limited its 
application of the PDVA to “violence that occurs in a family or family-
like setting.”200  Again, this rationale does not portend a favorable 
result for a woman in a situation similar to the one in which S.P. 
found herself.  Courts extend PDVA protection to vulnerable persons 
who are placed “in a more susceptible position for abusive and 
controlling behavior” by virtue of the underlying domestic 
relationship.201  But S.P. had been placed in a susceptible position 
solely by virtue of her residence, not an underlying domestic 
 
 193  Smith v. Moore, 689 A.2d 145, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997); see also 
Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 660 A.2d 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995). 
 194  Smith, 689 A.2d at 147. 
 195  Id. 
 196  Id. 
 197  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4(a). 
 198 Smith, 689 A.2d at 146. 
 199  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011). 
 200  Smith, 689 A.2d at 146. 
 201  Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001). 
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relationship.202  Thus, a narrow interpretation of the PDVA may have 
grave consequences for women in a situation similar to S.P.  The 
plaintiff in Smith sought a civil protection order to prevent the 
defendant from going to her house.  This request certainly seemed 
understandable given the facts, but the court correctly held that the 
PDVA does not afford a potential victim such protection.203 
3.  Women susceptible to imminent violence 
Coleman v. Roman provides an instructive analysis on how New 
Jersey courts decide whether parties are household members under 
the PDVA.204  The Coleman court examines the subtle differences in 
approaches taken in prior decisions.205 
Jutchenko looks forward in time, and focuses on whether the 
former relationship “provides a special opportunity” for 
domestic violence, thus triggering the need for protection 
and prevention in the future. Tribuzio to some extent looks 
backward, and focuses on whether the domestic violence 
was related to and arose out of the past domestic 
relationship. The approaches are complementary. Either 
kind of case can implicate the Act’s remedial goals. Put 
another way, a court must inquire whether the parties have 
been so entangled, emotionally or physically—or they will be 
in the future—that the court should invoke the Act to protect 
the plaintiff and prevent future violence.206 
The court explicitly recognizes that the PDVA should protect a 
woman at risk for potential future violence based on a “continuing, 
entangled relationship.”207  S.P.’s attacker all but assured her that the 
two would be physically entangled in the future.208  But the Coleman 
court makes this assertion under the predicate of a former 
relationship shared between parties.209  There is no common-sense 
rationale to recognize a distinction between one who is susceptible to 
danger based on a former relationship as opposed to one who is 
susceptible based on a living arrangement.  Surely the legislature 
 
 202  See supra Part V. 
 203  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-17–35. 
 204  Coleman v. Romano, 908 A.2d 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006). 
 205  See Jutchenko v. Jutchenko, 660 A.2d 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) 
(finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter under the PDVA 
since the two parties had not resided in the same household for twenty years); see also 
Tribuzio v. Roder, 813 A.2d 1210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 206  Coleman, 908 A.2d at 259. 
 207  Id. 
 208  S.P. v. Newark Police Dept., 52 A.3d 178, 180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012).   
 209  Coleman, 908 A.2d at 259. 
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could not think that those in the latter circumstance are any less 
worthy of protection under New Jersey law.  It may be true that such 
protection is not warranted pursuant to an Act that protects against 
domestic violence.  But it seems illogical and unjust to not afford a 
woman who is in imminent danger protection via an alternative 
statute.210 
B.  Other Jurisdictions Interpret “household member” Similarly 
An examination of other states’ interpretations of “household 
member” reveals that S.P. would likely not be considered a household 
member in any jurisdiction pursuant to other domestic violence laws.  
In comparison with other jurisdictions, New Jersey affords protection 
to a relatively wide range of victims under its PDVA, although even 
under its law, victims of acquaintance and stranger violence may not 
obtain a civil protection order due to the relationship requirement.  
What follows is an examination of domestic violence cases in different 
states across the country, including an analysis of the S.P. facts under 
the various case holdings.  Specifically, this Comment will compare 
New Jersey’s precedent with cases decided in California, Minnesota, 
Iowa, and Kentucky. 
In the particularly illustrative California case of O’Kane v. Irvine, 
an appellate court reversed the trial court’s imposition of a domestic 
violence restraining order under similar circumstances to those in 
S.P.211  There, as in S.P., the defendant leased a bedroom in a house 
cohabitated by the plaintiff.212  The plaintiff and defendant shared 
common areas including the bathroom, kitchen, and living room.213  
Additionally, the parties did not have a prior relationship before 
entering into their individual leasing agreements.214  After a few weeks 
of living in the same house, the two got into an altercation, and the 
police were called, but they made no arrest.215  The plaintiff 
subsequently obtained a TRO by alleging that the defendant had hit 
her.216 
 
 210  See infra Part VI.  An alternative statute for non-intimate partner violence has 
become a necessity for potential victims such as S.P.  An alternative statute is 
necessary because at its most liberal interpretation, the term “household member” 
does not afford many potential victims protection under the PDVA.   
 211  O’Kane v. Irving, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549, 552 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 212  Id. at 550. 
 213  Id. 
 214  Id. 
 215  Id. 
 216  Id. 
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California domestic violence law protects “cohabitants.”217  The 
California statute defines a “cohabitant” as “a person who regularly 
resides in the household.”218  The California courts define 
“household” as “a collection of persons, whether related or not, who 
live together as a group or unit of permanent or domestic character, 
with one head, under one roof, or within a common curtilage, who 
direct their attention toward a common goal consisting of their 
mutual interests.”219  But the court concluded that California’s 
domestic violence laws were inapplicable to two parties living in 
separate rooms and sharing common areas.220  Because the parties 
were not previously acquainted, were connected “wholly by 
happenstance,” and did not live together as a group with a common 
goal, the court reversed the TRO as outside the jurisdiction of the 
domestic violence law.221  Similarly, S.P. and Santiago were not 
previously acquainted and formed their “relationship” solely by 
happenstance.  This holding illustrates the ambiguity of determining 
who qualifies as a “household member.” 
A Minnesota case, Elmasry v. Verdin, also involved facts that were 
similar to those in S.P.  The case involved two parties who lived 
together in a duplex.222  The respondent paid rent to the petitioner 
on a month-to-month basis.223  The petitioner considered their shared 
relationship as one between “housemates” since they were not 
romantically involved.224  The unit did not contain any locked or 
secured rooms.225  Soon after moving in, the respondent’s actions and 
behavior became increasingly aggressive and verbally abusive, causing 
the petitioner to call the police.226  The trial court felt that the dispute 
was a landlord-tenant matter and not one of domestic violence.227  But 
the appellate court reversed, holding that because the parties shared 
common living areas of the duplex, they were “residing together,” 
and therefore met the definition of “household members” under 
Minnesota’s domestic violence act.228 
 
 217  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6209 (West 2011). 
 218  Id. 
 219  O’Kane, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 552. 
 220  Id. 
 221  Id. 
 222  Elmasry v. Verdin, 727 N.W.2d 163, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 
 223  Id. at 164. 
 224  Id. 
 225  Id. 
 226  Id. 
 227  Id. 
 228  Elmasry, 727 N.W.2d at 166. 
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The Elmasry decision would seem to include, under Minnesota 
domestic violence law, the type of relationship that S.P. and Santiago 
shared.  But the real significance of Elmasry is that the court 
suggested that had the appellant and respondent lived in separate, 
self-contained units, with secured and locked areas, the trial court 
“might have been correct in concluding that respondent was merely 
appellant’s tenant and that the two did not reside together.”229  This 
characterization describes the living situation in S.P. and that of 
apartment complexes and hotels. 
The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted a framework to determine 
whether a couple is cohabiting for the purposes of criminal law 
enforcement of domestic abuse assault.230  Iowa courts consider six 
factors in making such a determination: (1) sexual relations between 
the parties while sharing the same living quarters; (2) sharing of 
income or expenses; (3) joint use or ownership of property; (4) 
whether the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife; (5) the 
continuity of the relationship; and (6) the length of the 
relationship.231 
In State v. Kellogg, an unmarried man and woman had ended 
their intimate relationship but remained roommates, living together 
in separate bedrooms.232  Kellogg was charged with domestic abuse 
assault after he kicked his former companion with spurred boots and 
hit her, leaving her with “bruises, scabs, black eyes, and swelling.”233  
But since the judge had given an overly broad jury instruction under 
which “mere roommates” could obtain statutory protection, the Iowa 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, thus leaving 
his victim with no protection under the domestic violence law.234  By 
contrast, Santiago and S.P. were separated by a hallway and did not 
have access to each other’s apartments. 
Lastly, in Barnett v. Wiley, the Kentucky Supreme Court quoted 
with approval a treatise explaining that the purpose of its domestic 
violence statute was to “protect victims from harm caused by the 
person whose intimate physical relationship to the victim increases 
the danger of harm, either because the parties live in physical 
proximity or because the relationship is one whose intimacy may 
 
 229  Id. at 166. 
 230  State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514 (Iowa 1996). 
 231  Colker, supra note 51, at 1857 (citing Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 518). 
 232  Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 515. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Id. 
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disable the victim from seeking protection.”235  This interpretation 
would seem to offer a victim in S.P.’s situation the possibility of 
receiving protection under the PDVA. Nevertheless, New Jersey does 
not typically afford that status where there is a lack of a prior 
relationship.236  Therefore, despite the seemingly inclusive definition 
put forth in Barnett, a civil protection order will often be unavailable 
to a party solely on the basis of living in the same boarding house as 
her potential attacker, unless the court equates a boarding house 
with a household.237 
To the extent the New Jersey Appellate Division looks to other 
states for guidance in interpreting the “household member” 
requirement, the preceding cases suggest that many potential victims 
may not be deemed a “household member” entitled to protection 
under the PDVA, even given the recent holding in S.P.  Domestic 
violence statutes are not construed broadly enough to protect women 
who may not be involved in a traditional relationship with a 
defendant, even under the “household member” criteria.  The 
question thus remains: How can New Jersey protect women who do 
not fall within the jurisdiction of the PDVA from imminent harm? 
VI.  WHAT ACTION SHOULD THE NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE TAKE?          
A CALL FOR REFORM 
If the legislature fails to change the status quo, civil protective 
orders will remain under-inclusive because they are available only for 
incidents that count as “domestic violence,” or violence between 
specific categories of people not including strangers, and even 
excluding many acquaintances.238  New Jersey law governing civil 
protection orders is inadequate.  A woman must be given the 
opportunity to use an alternative-remedy statute such as a civil 
protection order as a sword, rather than a shield.  New Jersey has two 
options to improve its law.  It can either expand the PDVA’s 
definition of “household member” or draft an alternative remedy 
statute to protect women from non-intimate violence. 
 
 235  Barnett v. Wiley, 103 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Ky. 2003) (quoting 15 Louise E. Graham 
& James E. Keller, KENTUCKY PRACTICE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW § 5.1, at 107 (2d ed. 
1997)). 
 236  See Coleman v. Romano, 908 A.2d 254, 259 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2006). 
 237  See Hamilton v. Ali, 795 A.2d 929, 934 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (holding, 
contrary to precedent, that acquaintances were “household members” as defined by 
the PDVA). 
 238  See supra Part III. 
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A.  Expand the Definition of “household member” Under the PDVA 
The first option for the legislature is to amend the language of 
“household member” to make it more expansive and thus include 
women who share a roof with their abuser.  This definition would 
include situations in which two parties share a “common-area.”  Such 
an interpretation would inevitably include boarding house, 
apartment, and condominium-building dwellers living in separate 
apartments, and perhaps even hotel guests in separate rooms.  Even 
laundry rooms, exercise rooms, storage areas, pools, and locker 
rooms represent examples of spatial areas that have the potential to 
bring residents under a common roof into contact with each other.  
Occupants of these shared facilities would be protected under an 
amendment to the PDVA, because they represent areas in which 
victims of prior violence by an acquaintance or stranger may be 
particularly vulnerable to repeated attack. 
One significant problem with this approach is in the area of New 
Jersey’s mandatory domestic violence arrest law.  The legislature has 
traditionally afforded police officers discretion on whether to make 
an arrest upon responding to a call.239  In contrast, the PDVA requires 
that the police make an arrest in certain cases involving domestic 
violence as interpreted under the PDVA.240  Therefore, under an 
expanded definition of “household member,” officers would be 
mandated to arrest in response to domestic violence calls in a 
substantially increased number of situations.  Consequently, an 
expanded definition of “household member” under the PDVA could 
potentially lead to increased litigation. 
Another adverse effect that could arise if the legislature adopted 
this approach would be an increase in frivolous restraining order case 
filings.  If a broader category of potential plaintiffs could seek relief, 
there might be a need to mitigate the harm from an abuse of the 
system.  It would be nearly impossible to draft a definition that 
protects the especially vulnerable without protecting those that the 
statute is not intended to protect.  The primary challenge would 
involve defining the living arrangements to which the amended 
statute would apply.  For example, would the expanded definition of 
“household member” apply to persons living in the same apartment 
complex, with perhaps a shared parking lot and mailbox area, but 
not the same apartment building?  What about a townhouse 
community that shares common areas such as a gym?  It is likely that 
 
 239  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §59:3-2(a) (West 2011). 
 240  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West 2011).  
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the legislature left the interpretation of “household member” to the 
courts to avoid these questions that better lend themselves to a case-
by-case analysis. 
B.  An Alternative-Remedy Statute to Protect Women from Acquaintance 
and Stranger Violence 
The New Jersey Legislature should add an alternative-remedy 
statute to the law that is modeled after similar statutes enacted by 
other states and that affords women the option of obtaining a 
restraining order in situations involving violence perpetrated by an 
acquaintance or a stranger.241  The historic nature of marriage was the 
impetus for the construction of domestic violence law in its initial 
form.242  In light of the changed circumstances involving different 
relationships and varied living situations, it is incumbent upon the 
legislature to take action that recognizes the reality that there are 
many victims of violence currently in need of, but unable to obtain, 
civil protection orders.  New Jersey domestic violence law has evolved 
to reflect changing relationships, thereby offering protection to an 
increased and broad range of people.  But the most consequential, 
and the most effective, change to New Jersey law would be the 
addition of an alternative civil protective order option to the 
domestic violence civil restraining order and criminal law options 
already in place. 
The legislature specifically stated that “the official response to 
domestic violence shall communicate the attitude that violent 
behavior will not be excused or tolerated.”243  An alternative-remedy 
statute that applies to non-intimate partner violence can further that 
objective and act in combination with the PDVA to accomplish the 
stated goal.  As aforementioned, civil protection orders are now the 
most frequently used legal remedy to address intimate partner 
violence.244  Civil protection orders should thus be available to a 
broader range of potential victims, including women living under the 
same roof as someone who has assaulted or harassed them.  An 
alternative civil protection order statute would potentially allow any 
woman to obtain a protection order against someone who presents 
 
 241  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (2009).  For example, 
Maryland has removed its relationship requirement entirely.  Id.  It allows any woman 
to obtain a civil protection order without proving the existence of a prior 
relationship.  Id.  A woman merely needs to be subject to an act that that places her 
in fear of imminent serious bodily harm to have a civil protection order issued.  Id. 
 242  Tsai, supra note 36, at 1289. 
 243  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 2011). 
 244  See supra Part III. 
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an imminent danger to her safety. 
It is counterintuitive to allow such violence to be excused and, by 
extension, tolerated when the addition of a civil protection order law 
would sufficiently address this problem.  The purpose of protective 
orders is to prevent violence or stop it from escalating.245  The 
distinction between women in S.P.’s situation and women who are 
protected under the PDVA is razor-thin, and a criminal order of 
protection is often insufficient to a potential victim’s needs.  But in 
New Jersey, the law allows a woman to obtain a civil protection order 
only where she is a victim of domestic violence.246  New Jersey’s 
legislative scheme is outdated.  The addition of an alternative civil 
protection order statute would merely provide protection where it is 
needed.  If New Jersey had adopted Maryland’s law, S.P. would have 
been able to immediately obtain a civil protection order after her first 
encounter with Santiago because his actions placed her in fear of 
imminent bodily harm.247 
Maryland does not require a “relationship” pre-requisite for a 
petitioner to seek relief through a civil protection order.248  Instead, 
Maryland allows a woman to seek relief by filing a petition with the 
court that alleges a petitioner was guilty of an act that places the 
petitioner in fear of imminent serious bodily harm, stalking, or 
harassment.249  If New Jersey had a similar law in place, S.P. would 
have had an opportunity to seek relief prior to her attack. 
The proposed statute would authorize the immediate issuance of 
an ex parte protective order where the PDVA does not apply, most 
likely because the victim lacks a prior relationship with the offender.  
It would allow a court to issue a TRO upon an allegation that a 
person had committed an offense such as harassment, stalking, 
assault, sexual assault, or terroristic threats.  Therefore, the statute 
would allow a casual acquaintance or a co-worker to obtain a TRO, 
which is currently unavailable under the PDVA.  Therefore, New 
Jersey should permit a petitioner who suffers from such offenses as 
protected by the PDVA to petition the court for an order that the 
defendant: (1) refrain from abusing or harassing the plaintiff; (2) 
refrain from contacting the plaintiff; (3) remain away from the 
plaintiff’s household, workplace, or school; and (4) pay the plaintiff 
monetary compensation for the losses suffered as a direct result of 
 
 245  Smith, supra note 74, at 139–40. 
 246  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:25-17–35 (West 2011). 
 247  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 3-1503 (2009). 
 248  Id. 
 249  Id. 
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the defendant’s actions. 
The proposed statute would also allow the court to enter such 
temporary relief orders without notice, as it deems necessary to 
protect the plaintiff.  The durational aspect of the protection 
afforded by temporary relief is important.  The legislature should 
institute a time limit of six months for such an order.  A significant 
time limit may conceivably minimize the potential damage from the 
anticipated increase in frivolous filings, as manifested by differing 
situations that may arise such as verbal harassment or physical 
violence.  Also, in many cases of stranger and acquaintance abuse, the 
likelihood of chance interaction will abate after a few years due to 
intervening factors.  For instance, people often move, change jobs, or 
change schools.  The goal of the legislature should be to limit 
potential system-wide abuse, while still providing victims with the 
requisite protection.  New Jersey must follow Maryland’s lead and 
reform its civil protection order laws to provide broader protection to 
potential victims of sexual assault by those who may not be 
considered “household members” under the PDVA.  It can do so by 
no longer limiting the ability of victims to obtain restraining orders 
solely to those who are victims of domestic violence. 
Despite the inevitable criticism of a newly adopted alternative 
remedy statute, its potential benefits far outweigh any shortcoming of 
such a law.  Critics can, for example, rightly argue that a protection 
order does not guarantee a woman’s safety, because the law could not 
guarantee that victims will remain safe from harm once a civil 
protective order is granted.  If an abuser wants to harm his victim, or 
even kill her, a protective order or a short jail sentence will probably 
not stop him.250  But the possibility that a protection order will not 
help a potential victim should not prevent those who will benefit 
from a protection order from obtaining one.  Critics may also argue 
that it would be too expensive for New Jersey to expand its protection 
to victims of violence in non-intimate partner relationships.  But 
studies have shown that the use of protective orders can save New 
Jersey a significant amount of money in law enforcement and 
governing expenses.251  One can argue that the failure to enact such a 
statute is imposing unnecessary costs, both financial and emotional, 
on New Jersey. 
 
 250  See Anique Droin, Comment, Who Turned Out the Lights? How Maryland Laws 
Fail to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence from Third-Party Abuse, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 
105, 106 (2006). 
 251  See Stoever, supra note 53, at 308.  A recent study estimates that protection 
orders save Kentucky $85 million per year.  Id. 
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Although the New Jersey Legislature may not be able to prevent 
every incident of abuse, it must fill the gaps in the law that can be 
filled.  In S.P., such a law would have left no doubt that S.P. was 
legally entitled to obtain a restraining order after her eventual 
attacker harassed her for the first time.  The restraining order would 
have served notice to Santiago that he was to stay away from S.P. or 
face criminal charges.  This may or may not have deterred Santiago 
in this particular instance, but it would certainly offer relief in many 
cases where an alternative option would not otherwise exist. 
This Comment does not advocate a change of New Jersey’s 
domestic violence statute.  It is true that S.P. may not have been able 
to secure protection prior to her attack under the domestic violence 
laws of any other state.  But other states offer an alternative civil 
protective order as part of their anti-harassment statutes.252  New 
Jersey must follow the more progressive states that take this approach 
by adopting a similar statute to offer women like S.P. an alternative 
form of protection.  As discussed, Maryland currently has a law that 
New Jersey should examine in order to provide its own alternative-
remedy statute. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Domestic violence is a pervasive social problem that harms 
hundreds of women in the United States on a daily basis.253  
Lawmakers responded to the feminist movement of the 1960s by 
enacting domestic violence laws in an attempt to offer women better 
protection.254  New Jersey has one of the most liberal and expansive 
domestic violence laws among the states.255  Specifically, the judiciary 
has liberally interpreted the term “household member” to afford 
broad protection to many potential victims.256  But the PDVA still 
leaves many who are not covered under the Act unprotected.257  Such 
victims are forced to pursue remedies under oft-inadequate criminal 
laws.  Consequently, the need for reform in New Jersey is clear. 
Both acquaintances and strangers commit violent acts against 
women, and their actions transcend the sphere of domestic violence.  
The shift in the role of protective orders from instruments to prevent 
family violence to mechanisms to prevent stranger-induced violence 
 
 252  See supra note 93.  
 253  See supra Part II. 
 254  Id. 
 255  See supra Part IV. 
 256  See supra Part V.A. 
 257  See supra Part V. 
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supports an amendment to the current law in New Jersey.  Many 
states have implemented alternative remedy statutes to offer 
particularly susceptible women the opportunity to obtain civil 
protection orders if they are in imminent danger.258  These statutes 
represent progress in the effort to offer women protection from 
stranger-induced violence.  But this remedy is not available to 
potential victims in New Jersey.  Women who live in boarding houses 
may be particularly prone to violence, and are currently defenseless. 
The legislature must add an alternative remedy statute that 
would allow potential victims from non-intimate partner violence to 
obtain civil protection orders.259  It can do so by creating an 
alternative statute to limit the relief available to victims not in a 
domestic violence relationship.  By doing so, the legislature can 
minimize the potential damage from the anticipated increased 
number of frivolous or “less serious” filings, while still providing 
victims with the requisite protection.  All women are entitled to be 
safe from violence.  New Jersey should adopt a civil protection order 
law to offer its women protection from non-intimate partner violence. 
 
 
 258  See supra Part III.A. 
 259  See supra Part VI. 
